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NLSIR

FROM THE GHOST OF KHIMJI
TO THE FLAWS OF KANDLA:
DECIPHERING SECTION 13 OF THE
COMMERCIAL COURTS ACT
—Mansi Sood*

Abstract The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides for
a wide range of situations in which first appeals can be preferred against judgments and/or orders of an ordinary civil
court. Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 consciously departs from this to improve efficiency and only permits a narrow range of first appeals in commercial decisions,
including arbitration matters. While the legislative intent was
laudable, its imprecise wording has given rise to conflicting interpretations in various judgments. This essay argues
that in particular, it remains unclear whether interlocutory
orders are appealable and whether appeals under s.50 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 are permissible under
Section 13. In arguing for the exclusion of both these categories, it makes the case for a restrictive interpretation that
furthers the aim of speedy disposal of commercial disputes.

I. INTRODUCTION
When the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (‘CCA’) was enacted, its promise of
expeditious disposal of commercial disputes was sought to be achieved through
the twin prongs of specialised courts and efficient procedures.1 Case management hearings,2 stringent requirements for document disclosure,3 and greater
power to control and regulate evidence4 were some of the novel introductions
made towards this end. In addition, a whole new hierarchy of commercial
*

1

2
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4

Mansi Sood is an Advocate, New Delhi. The author would like to thank Vinayak Mehrotra for
the discussions that have informed some of the arguments in this paper.
See, Statement of Objects and Reasons, Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and
Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act 2015.
CCA, s 16 r/w sch para 7.
CCA, s 16 r/w sch para 4(E).
CCA, s 16 r/w sch para 10.
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courts was created, along with scope for appointment of judges with commercial experience to such courts.5
As anticipated, the initial days of this legislation saw the emergence of a
few stumbling blocks.6 Some provisions were unclear, while others faced the
hurdle of ineffective implementation due to an endemic of issues affecting
India’s justice delivery system.7 Yet others were dissonant with related provisions in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (‘1996 Act’).8 In turn, this
hampered a key governmental objective of the legislation – improvement of
India’s ranking in the Ease of Doing Business Index published by the World
Bank.9 Therefore, when the CCA was amended in 2018, it was expected that
there would be comprehensive redressal of these shortcomings. Unfortunately,
while the 2018 amendment10 did get rid of some issues, it only put temporary
fixes on others.
Section 13 of the CCA presents one such instance. Envisaged as a key
aspect of speedy resolution, this section sought to restrict the scope of appeals
from first-instance commercial decisions, in comparison with ordinary civil
matters. While interlocutory orders under Order XLIII of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (‘CPC’) are appealable in both cases, section 13 aimed to preclude appeals from commercial orders under other special provisions, including
but not limited to the Letters Patent,11 applicable in certain High Courts having original civil jurisdiction. Initially, the lack of clarity in its text gave rise
to conflicting interpretations that threatened to undermine its original intent.12
Thereafter, the 2018 amendment resolved some of these conflicts but gave
rise to fresh ones, thereby failing to provide a complete remedy.13 This essay
5
6
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CCA, ss 4 and 5.
Sulabh Rewari and Poorvi Satija, ‘Are Commercial Courts the Answer to India’s Arbitration
Woes?’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 25 December 2015) <http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.
com/2015/12/25/are-commercial-courts-the-answer-to-indias-arbitration-woes/> accessed 22
October 2020.
Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy, ‘Commercial Courts Act, 2015: An Empirical Impact
Evaluation’ (5 July 2019) 31-34 <https://vidhilegalpolicy.in/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/CoC_
Digital_10June_noon.pdf> accessed 22 September 2020.
Vanita Bhargava, Jeevan Ballav Panda and Kudrat Dev, ‘Transition from Commercial Courts
Ordinance to Commercial Courts Act: Ambiguities and Implications’ (International Law
Office, 26 May 2016) <www.internationallawoffice.com/Newsletters/Arbitration-ADR/India/
Khaitan-Co/Transition-from-Commercial-Courts-Ordinance-to-Commercial-Courts-Actambiguities-and-implications#> accessed 22 October 2020.
Sai Ramani Garimella and MZ Ashraful, ‘The Emergence of International Commercial Courts
in India: A Narrative for Ease of Doing Business?’ (2019) 1 Erasmus Law Review 111 <www.
erasmuslawreview.nl/tijdschrift/ELR/2019/1/ELR-D-18-00026.pdf > accessed 23 October
2020.
The Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High
Courts (Amendment) Act, 2018 (‘2018 amendment’).
Letters Patent of the High Court of Judicature for the Presidency of Bombay (28 December
1865) (‘Letters Patent’), cl 15.
Part I(A).
Part I(B).
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argues that in light of such persisting conflict, the scope of this section remains
unclear even today. It argues for a narrow interpretation of section 13 and analyses this section from the lens of two principal points of debate.
The first is the nature of appealable orders – interlocutory versus final – and
ancillary issues that arise from it. As such, the latest interpretation rendered
by the Bombay High Court14 appears consistent with the overall thrust of the
CCA, pending the final word from the Supreme Court. However, it is argued
that despite this clarification, the wording of the section retains ambiguity
due to internal inconsistencies. The 2018 amendment could have conclusively
resolved this, but its failure to do so leaves room for fresh conflicts, some of
which are highlighted in this essay.
The second is the subject matter of cases that are appealable under section
13. Judicial decisions have long struggled to make sense of sub-section (1A)
and the proviso thereto (sub-section (1) prior to the 2018 amendment), both
of which lend themselves to multiple interpretations. Notable among these is
Kandla,15 which remains the most important, albeit flawed, pronouncement in
this regard. In analysing its reasoning, this essay argues that legislative oversight and judicial jugglery have resulted in broadening the scope of section 13
beyond its underlying intent. The inconsistency with corresponding provisions
in the 1996 Act has further compounded the confusion. It is concluded that a
legislative amendment is imperative to resolve this conundrum and preserve
the logic and efficiency of commercial dispute resolution.
This essay is divided into three parts. Part II outlines the nature of appealable orders under section 13 and potential challenges in this regard. Part III
dissects the decision in Kandla and highlights three major shortcomings. Part
IV builds on this to make out a case for a narrow interpretation of section 13.

II. THE GHOST OF KHIMJI16
Prior to its amendment in 2018, section 13(1)17 read as follows –
13. Appeals from decrees of Commercial Courts and
Commercial Divisions–
(1) Any person aggrieved by the decision of the Commercial
Court or Commercial Division of a High Court may appeal to
the Commercial Appellate Division of that High Court within
14

15
16
17

Shailendra Bhadauria v Matrix Partners India Investment Holdings LLC (2018) SCC Online
Bom 13804 (‘Shailendra Bhadauria’).
Kandla Export Corpn v OCI Corpn (2018) 14 SCC 715 (‘Kandla’).
Shah Babulal Khimji v Jayaben D Kania (1981) 4 SCC 8 (‘Khimji’).
CCA, s 13(1).
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a period of sixty days from the date of judgment or order, as
the case may be:
Provided that an appeal shall lie from such orders passed by
a Commercial Division or a Commercial Court that are specifically enumerated under Order XLIII of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) as amended by this Act and
Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26
of 1996).
On a plain reading, this provision and its heading contain 4 separate terms
– decree,18 decision, judgment19 and order20 – whose definitions collectively
govern the nature of permissible appeals. With the exception of ‘decision’,
these terms are defined in the CPC and the same definitions are made applicable to the CCA as well, by virtue of section 2(2).21 Consequently, their usage in
this section is puzzling at the outset – while the trigger is clearly a grievance
against a ‘decision’, the appeal is then to be preferred against the ‘judgment’ or
‘order’, as it may be.
This is further complicated by the possible application of Khimji, thereby
giving a wide import to the word ‘judgment’. In Khimji, the court was called
upon to consider the scope of the word ‘judgment’ under Clause 15 of the
Letters Patent. In doing so, the main controversy that it examined was whether
interlocutory orders that were not appealable under Order XLIII, CPC could
nevertheless be appealed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In a seminal
decision, the court ruled that the import of ‘judgment’ under Clause 15 was
wider than ‘judgment’ in the CPC. Therefore, orders not covered by Order
XLIII, CPC could be appealed under Letters Patent as long as they “possess
the characteristics and trappings of finality”, insofar as they affect valuable
rights of parties and/or cause them serious injustice.22
Consequently, when the CCA was first enacted in 2015, these doubts regarding the interpretation of section 13 were brought to the attention of multiple
courts.

A. Conflicting Interpretations and Judicial Discipline
In one of the earliest cases to grapple with this issue, namely Hubtown Ltd.
v. IDBI Trusteeship Service Ltd., the Bombay High Court interpreted section

18
19
20
21
22

CPC, s 2(2).
CPC, s 2(9).
CPC, s 2(14).
CCA, s 2(2).
Khimji [113], [115].
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13 in a manner favouring a wide jurisdiction for commercial appellate courts.23
It opined that the scope of the main provision had to be wider than that of
the proviso; the main provision uses three of the four terms (except ‘decree’),
whereas the proviso only refers to ‘orders’.24 Thus, placing reliance on Khimji,25
it held that the main part of section 13 would include appeals from interlocutory orders other than those specified under Order XLIII, CPC, as long as they
have “a tinge or colour of judgment”.26 However, a year later, another Division
Bench of the same court unwittingly departed from this view in Sushila
Singhania v. Bharat Hari Singhania.27 Without explicitly considering Hubtown,
they observed that ‘decision’ could not receive a wide construction and was
equivalent to a ‘decree’.28 Further, ‘judgment’ was not to be interpreted in
line with Khimji as the latter interpreted ‘judgment’ in the context of Letters
Patent, whose application was explicitly barred by section 13(2) of CCA. Thus,
it was held that the proviso to section 13(1) is entirely self-contained and only
the appeals specified therein are maintainable.29
Almost simultaneously, the Delhi High Court considered the same question
in HPL (India) Ltd. v. QRG Enterprises,30 and affirmed the Sushila Singhania
viewpoint. After a detailed consideration of each of the four terms, it held that
a ‘decree’ is different from an ‘order’, and although both are ‘decisions’, neither is a ‘judgment’ i.e. the statement based on the reasons in the decree or
order.31 On this basis, the court concluded that ‘judgment’ as used in section
13 is a misnomer and refers to ‘decree’, since the scheme of the CPC only permits appeals from either decrees or orders but not from judgments.32 Further, it
affirmed that the Khimji interpretation would be inapplicable as the import of
‘judgment’ under the CPC is narrower than under Letters Patent and application of the latter is excluded by section 13(2).33 It also observed that since section 13 uses ‘judgment’ and ‘order’ disjunctively, one cannot be brought within
the other by applying the Khimji interpretation.34 In deciding this question, the
Delhi High Court considered and explicitly chose to differ from the Hubtown
position.35

23
24
25
26
27

28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

Hubtown Ltd v IDBI Trusteeship Service Ltd (2016) SCC OnLine Bom 9019 (‘Hubtown’).
ibid [33].
See also, Midnapore People’s Coop. Bank v Chunilal Nanda (2006) 5 SCC 399.
Hubtown [33]; See also, Khimji [113] – [120].
Sushila Singhania v Bharat Hari Singhania (2017) SCC OnLine Bom 360 : (2017) 3 AIR Bom
R 357 (‘Sushila Singhania’).
ibid [81], [84], [87].
Sushila Singhania (n 27) [94].
HPL (India) Ltd v QRG Enterprises (2017) SCC OnLine Del 6955 (‘HPL’).
ibid [26].
HPL (n 30) [27].
Hubtown (n 23).
HPL (n 30) [33], [40], [41].
HPL [55], [56].
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Later in the same year, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court had a
chance to revisit this issue yet again, in Sigmarq.36 Although the decision in
HPL was not brought to its notice, it did take note of the decisions in Hubtown
and Sushila Singhania. However, instead of bringing much-needed clarity, this
decision only amplified the prevailing confusion. It observed that it did not
need to answer the larger question posed before it (i.e., regarding the scope
of s.13). Furthermore, it refrained from answering whether there was a conflict between Hubtown and Sushila Singhania, because the impugned order in
question was not ‘final’. The court reasoned that any eventual decree on merits
would still be appealable. Consequently, the objection of territorial jurisdiction,
which was the subject of the impugned order, would be available as a ground
of appeal.37 Having thus dealt with the facts before it, the court then examined
Hubtown and Sushila Singhania for the sake of judicial discipline.38 Eventually,
it found that there was no divergence between the two judgments and that reconciliation was possible as they both hold that–
the term ‘decision’ cannot be interpreted to mean any and
every order by styling it as a judgment. It is that decision,
which satisfies the tests referred by us above and which tests
can also be culled out from the definition of the term ‘decree’
as appearing in section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which would be appealable.39
In my opinion, the judgment in Sigmarq is problematic on four separate
counts. First, its observation that it does not need to interpret section 13 due
to its particular facts is inaccurate and erroneous. The scope of section 13
and maintainability of the appeal thereunder was squarely raised before the
court.40 It could not have applied the law to the facts without clarifying the
law itself. To put it simply, if the court were to restrict section 13 appeals to
orders specifically enumerated in Order XLIII, CPC or section 37, 1996 Act,
then the inconclusive nature of an order would be irrelevant. Therefore, its failure to crystallise the legal position that it proposed to apply, is a fundamental
error in reasoning. Second, its finding that the impugned order is not conclusive, because territorial jurisdiction will still be available as a ground of appeal
against any eventual decree, is also plainly incorrect. Rightly or wrongly,
the court had itself stated that the question before it was whether or not the
impugned order was a final determination affecting valuable rights of the parties.41 Further, it made extensive reference to Khimji for elaborating upon the
36

37
38
39
40
41

Sigmarq Technologies (P) Ltd v Manugrah India Ltd (2017) SCC OnLine Bom 9191
(‘Sigmarq’).
ibid [85].
Sigmarq (n 36) [86].
Sigmarq (n 36) [90].
Sigmarq (n 36) [14] – [17].
Sigmarq (n 36) [83].
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test for such a determination.42 Yet, the court failed to note that the factual situation before it was expressly considered in Khimji and the impugned order
would be conclusive on this basis –
(b) Another shape which a preliminary judgment may take is
that where the Trial Judge passes an order after hearing the
preliminary objections raised by the defendant relating to
maintainability of the suit, e.g., bar of jurisdiction, res judicata, a manifest defect in the suit, absence of notice under
Section 80 and the like, and these objections are decided
by the Trial Judge against the defendant, the suit is not terminated but continues and has to be tried on merits but the
order of the Trial Judge rejecting the objections doubtless
adversely affects a valuable right of the defendant who, if
his objections are valid, is entitled to get the suit dismissed
on preliminary grounds. Thus, such an order even though it
keeps the suit alive, undoubtedly decides an important aspect
of the trial which affects a vital right of the defendant and
must, therefore, be construed to be a judgment so as to be
appealable to larger Bench.43 (emphasis added)
Third, as noted above,44 the word ‘decision’ is not defined in either the CPC
or the CCA, and ought not to have been used in the section for this reason
alone. Be that as it may, there is no independent basis for the definition given
by the court other than the arbitrary equation of ‘decision’ with ‘decree’ in
Sushila Singhania, which is adopted as it is in Sigmarq.45 In fact, this plainly
reveals the fallacy of the court’s analysis. On one hand, it purports to read
‘decision’ as ‘decree’ by applying Sushila Singhania, thereby implicitly rejecting Khimji and narrowing the scope of section 13. On the other hand, by
using Khimji to delineate the test for appealable ‘decisions’,46 it has the opposite effect of expanding section 13 and approving Hubtown. These positions
are mutually inconsistent and their purported reconciliation in Sigmarq presents a logical flaw in its reasoning. Fourth, in the interest of judicial discipline, the court ought to have referred this issue to a larger bench. Although
this argument was canvassed before the court, it declined a reference on the
basis of its finding that there was no conflict. As noted above, this conclusion
rests on flimsy grounds and settlement by a larger bench would have furthered
the cause of certainty. It is well settled that even in High Courts,47 coordinate
benches are ordinarily bound by decisions of previous benches of the same
42
43
44
45
46
47

Sigmarq (n 36) [66] – [77].
Khimji [113] (emphasis added).
Khimji (n 22).
Sigmarq [88].
Sigmarq [83], [84], [90], [96].
Safiya Bee v Mohd. Vajahath Hussain (2011) 2 SCC 94 [28] – [30].
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strength.48 In case, conflicting decisions of two co-equal benches are placed
before a later bench, the proper course is for the matter to be referred to a
larger bench for authoritative settlement.49
This was the chaos into which the 2018 amendment was introduced,
whereby the word “decision” was replaced with “judgment or order” and the
erstwhile s.13(1) was made section 13(1A). Thus, section 13 now reads as follows –
13. Appeals from decrees of Commercial Courts and
Commercial Divisions–
(1) Any person aggrieved by the judgment or order of a
Commercial Court below the level of a District Judge may
appeal to the Commercial Appellate Court within a period of
sixty days from the date of judgment or order.
(1A) Any person aggrieved by the judgment or order of a
Commercial Court at the level of District Judge exercising
original civil jurisdiction or, as the case may be, Commercial
Division of a High Court may appeal to the Commercial
Appellate Division of that High Court within a period of
sixty days from the date of the judgment or order:
Provided that an appeal shall lie from such orders passed by
a Commercial Division or a Commercial Court that are specifically enumerated under Order XLIII of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) as amended by this Act and section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of
1996).
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for
the time being in force or Letters Patent of a High Court, no
appeal shall lie from any order or decree of a Commercial
Division or Commercial Court otherwise than in accordance
with the provisions of this Act.
Undoubtedly, this injected much-needed uniformity into the text of section
13 and resolved a large part of the problem, which was immediately noticed
by the Bombay High Court in Shailendra Bhadauria. However, it missed the

48
49

Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v State of Maharashtra (2005) 2 SCC 673 [12].
Jaisri Sahu v Rajdewan Dubey AIR (1962) SC 83 [9] – [11]; Zenith Steel Tubes & Industries
Ltd v Sicom Ltd (2008) 1 SCC 533 [39] – [40]; Atma Ram v State of Punjab AIR (1959) SC
519 [12].
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opportunity to decisively settle the conflicts regarding section 13 – a mistake
that is likely to prove costly in the future. The next section demonstrates why.

B. The 2018 Amendment and Shailendra Bhadauria
Taking note of the 2018 amendment and the conflicting interpretations rendered prior to it, the court in Shailendra Bhadauria opined that the Hubtown
and Sigmarq line of reasoning would have to give way to a narrower view and
the Khimji line of interpretation would no longer be tenable.50 Although the
decision proceeds on a sound basis, its deduction that Khimji has been conclusively discarded is not borne out. While the removal of ‘decision’ made section 13 internally harmonious to some extent, the failure to replace the word
‘judgment’ with ‘decree’, left it open to external dissonance in light of Khimji.
As rightly noted in HPL, the scheme of the CPC, and by extension, the CCA,
only permits appeals from decrees or orders.51 Therefore, it would have been
apposite for section 13 to be brought in line with this scheme. This would have
removed any potential conflict with section 13(2)52 while also making it consistent with section 37 of the 1996 Act, which refers to the “court authorised
by law to hear appeals from original decrees”. (emphasis added)
The fact that the section heading for section 13 already refers to ‘decrees’
would have only supported such a modification.53
Nevertheless, in attempting to make sense of the 2018 amendment, the
court rightly relied upon Kandla’s clarification that only those orders enumerated in Order XLIII of the CPC or section 37 of the 1996 Act are appealable
thereunder.54 It then went on to observe that what is directly disallowed cannot be indirectly allowed, i.e., orders that are not appealable as ‘orders’, cannot
be made appealable as ‘judgments’ by using Khimji.55 On the face of it therefore, Shailendra Bhadauria poses an unqualified bar against the application of
Khimji. This conclusion, however, can be questioned on two grounds.
First, in applying Kandla, the court here failed to appreciate that the Khimji
argument was neither made before the Supreme Court in that case, nor was
it even under consideration. In fact, Kandla proceeds on a different basis
altogether, i.e., that because section 50 of the 1996 Act, which also deals
with appealable orders, is a special enactment and a self-contained code, it
50
51
52
53

54
55

Shailendra Bhadauria [43] [44].
HPL [27].
Fuerst Day Lawson (n 61).
“It is true that a heading cannot control the interpretation of a clause if its meaning is otherwise plain and unambiguous, but it can certainly be referred to as indicating the general drift
of the clause and affording a key to a better understanding of its meaning.” – Union of India v
Raman Iron Foundry (1974) 2 SCC 231 [9].
Shailendra Bhadauria [37], [38].
Shailendra Bhadauria [43].
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must prevail over section 13, which is a general enactment in this context.56
Arguably therefore, the reliance on Kandla is questionable to the extent that
Kandla itself can be distinguished; it does not deal with situations where only
the general enactment is applicable. In any event, Kandla itself fails to justify a
water tight separation between the general and special enactments insofar as it
holds that section 13 would still provide the forum for appeals under section 50
of the 1996 Act (which falls outside the text of section 13). Hence, even by that
logic, the disqualification of appeals from orders not enumerated under section
13, is not necessarily absolute. Part III below contains a detailed analysis of
Kandla.
Second, this position renders the word ‘judgment’ completely otiose, insofar as it restricts section 13 to appeals against ‘orders’ alone. If this were truly
the legislative intent, then the word ‘judgment’ would have been removed
altogether. Notably, while section 13(1) and (1A) use the phrase “judgment
or order”, the non obstante clause in section 13(2) departs from this and uses
“order or decree”. Given that the Khimji argument hinges on an interpretation
of the term ‘judgment’ found under the Letters Patent, it could be argued that
this was done deliberately, to avoid the rigours of section 13(2) for ‘judgements’. In fact, a similar argument was taken in Shailendra Bhadauria itself,57
but was not explicitly considered.
As noted above, the 2018 amendment could have categorically removed
these doubts, but it failed to do so. Admittedly, neither of these two arguments are strong enough to completely turn the tide in favour of Khimji.
Nevertheless, they are sufficient to obviate its exclusion and trigger re-evaluation of this issue time and again, particularly since the Khimji argument has
previously found acceptance.58 In turn, this hinders certainty and erodes the
foundation of the CCA. Therefore, until a legislative amendment puts it to bed
once and for all, it is likely that the ghost of Khimji will continue to haunt section 13.

III. THE THREE FLAWS OF KANDLA
In Kandla, the central issue was whether an appeal against an order, which
was not maintainable under section 50 of the 1996 Act, would nevertheless be
maintainable under section 13 of the CCA. In its decision, the Supreme Court
clarified that such an appeal would not be independently maintainable under
s.13. In doing so, it held that the proviso to section 13, qualifies the main provision such that only orders specified under Order XLIII of CPC and section 37
of the 1996 Act are appealable under it. Further, even in cases where an appeal
is maintainable under section 50 of the 1996 Act, the ‘right’ to appeal will be
56
57
58

See, Kandla [20], [21].
Shailendra Bhadaauria [13]- [14].
See, Magic Frames v Radiance Media (P) Ltd (2019) 5 Mad LJ 479.
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traceable to the latter provision, it being a self-contained code; section 13 of
the CCA will provide only the ‘forum’ for such an appeal. Therefore, it concluded that section 13 would not apply to arbitration matters like those covered
by section 50, except to provide a forum for appeal where section 50 is already
applicable.59
I have no quarrel with the court’s reasoning, in so far as it concludes that
section 50 is a self-contained code and appeals not mentioned therein are
not permissible. This is also evident from the earlier decision in Fuerst Day
Lawson Ltd v. Jindal Exports Ltd60 that was relied upon here. However, the
second part of its reasoning regarding the interplay between section 13 and
section 50, in cases which are appealable under section 50, is deeply flawed for
three reasons –

A. The First Flaw in Kandla
The decision correctly notes that while section 37 and section 50 of the
1996 Act are both self-contained codes, the proviso to section 13(1A) makes
a distinction between them by specifically mentioning the former and omitting the latter. However, its consideration of the reasons for this distinction is
unsound. If section 37 and Order XLIII, CPC were merely included in the proviso to clarify that appeals not covered by either of these provisions would not
be independently maintainable under section 13 or ex abundanti cautela,61 then
the same logic should apply to section 50. Consequently, the exclusion of section 50 would mean that orders outside it are in fact appealable under section
13. However, the latter is untenable in light of Fuerst Day Lawson and has now
been confirmed in Kandla itself.

B. The Second Flaw in Kandla
Notwithstanding the fact that the proviso to section 13 omits any mention of
section 50, if appeals under section 50 are to nevertheless fall within its ambit,
then it implies one of three things.
One possibility is that the proviso to section 13(1A) is merely clarificatory
and does not actually qualify the operation of the main part of section 13(1A).
However, the presumptive interpretation of a proviso is that it carves out a field
of operation that would otherwise have been excluded from the main provision.
Exceptions to this rule are limited, and must be self-evident from the wording of the proviso.62 In fact, Kandla itself emphasises and affirms this read59
60
61
62

Kandla [21], [22].
(2011) 8 SCC 333 (‘Fuerst Day Lawson’).
Kandla [21].
CIT v Indo Mercantile Bank Ltd AIR (1959) SC 713; Kedarnath Jute Mfg Co Ltd v CTO AIR
(1966) SC 12; Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory v Subbash Chandra Yograj
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ing of the proviso to section 13(1A).63 Therefore, in the absence of an apparent
legislative intent, it would be inapposite to adopt an interpretation that relegates it to being merely clarificatory.
The second possibility is that appeals under section 50 will still be before
the Commercial Appellate Division, but will be outside the purview of section
13. Consequently, they will be subject to the more rigorous 30-day limitation
for intra-court appeals,64 rather than 60 days under section 13. This might also
explain the decision in Arun Dev, which held that an appeal under section 50(1)
(b) is maintainable before a Division Bench.65 However, this interpretation is
directly hit by section 13(2),66 which restricts appeals from the order/decree of
a Commercial Court or Division except in accordance with the CCA itself. In
my view, this is significant because it is not just a restriction on the appeals
before the Commercial Appellate Division, but indeed, on the right to appeal
against an order/decree of the Commercial Court/Division itself. I would argue
that this takes away the right to appeal under section 50 altogether, except
directly to the Supreme Court.
Kandla observes that the 1996 Act will prevail over the CCA on account of
it being a special enactment.67 However, it is arguable that in so far as commercial appeals are concerned, the reverse is true and the CCA ought to prevail.68 The CCA gives special consideration to arbitration matters,69 contains an
overarching non obstante clause,70 and is the more recent legislation.71 In light
of this inconsistency, a harmonious construction of the two is necessary, which
63
64
65
66
67
68

69
70
71

Sinha AIR (1961) SC 1596.
Kandla [13].
Limitation Act 1963, art 117.
Arun Dev Upadhyaya v Integrated Sales Service Ltd (2016) 9 SCC 524 (‘Arun Dev’).
CCA, s 13(2).
Kandla [20], [21].
LIC v DJ Bahadur (1981) 1 SCC 315 [52], [57]
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nor any rule of thumb. The peaceful coexistence of both legislations is best achieved, if that
be feasible, by allowing to each its allotted field for play. Sense and sensibility, not mechanical rigidity gives the flexible solution.
See, CCA, s 10.
CCA, s 21.
Ajoy Kumar Banerjee v Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 127 [38]. See also JK Cotton Spg & Wvg
Mills Co Ltd v State of UP AIR 1961 SC 1170 [9]
The general rule to be followed in case of conflict between two statutes is that the later
abrogates the earlier one. In other words, a prior special law would yield to a later general
law, if either of the two following conditions is satisfied:
‘(i) The two are inconsistent with each other.
(ii) There is some express reference in the later to the earlier enactment.’
If either of these two conditions is fulfilled, the later law, even though general, would
prevail.
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can only lead to the conclusion, that appeals under section 50 of the 1996 Act
are now preferable only before the Supreme Court.72 Any other interpretation
would mean that the Commercial Appellate Division can hear appeals other
than those under section 13, thereby defeating a basic premise of the CCA.73
A third and very unlikely possibility could be that arbitration appeals under
section 50 will go before a non-commercial Division Bench, and will be outside the purview of the CCA altogether. However, this would not stand to reason either. Section 10 of the CCA unequivocally brings all arbitration matters
within the purview of the commercial courts under it.74 Further, notwithstanding that this possibility would still be hit by section 13(2) as explained above,75
and that this is not what Kandla suggests at all, a non-commercial bench hearing an appeal from a commercial judge would be highly incongruous and
absurd. This would also mean that foreign awards are actually being given less
importance than domestic awards, which goes against the pro-foreign investor
stance of the CCA and the 1996 Act.76

C. The Third Flaw in Kandla
In order to explain the issue of right to appeal versus forum of appeal,
Kandla draws a parallel to section 10(1)(a) and section 10-F in the Companies
Act, 1956, by relying on the 2008 decision of Sumitomo.77 In interpreting section 50, Sumitomo held that once the right to appeal under section 50 was
attracted, the “court authorised by law to hear appeals from such order” would
be found by reference to the specific appellate hierarchy of the forum that had
passed the order.78 For instance, on those facts, the impugned order under section 45 of the 1996 Act, was passed by the erstwhile Company Law Board
(‘CLB’), and since appeals therefrom ordinarily lay to the High Court, the
appeal under section 50 would also be heard by the High Court. Kandla then
uses the same logic to hold that section 13 is a parallel instance of provision of
a forum for the exercise of the right under section 50.
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However, this reliance on Sumitomo ignores a crucial difference between
section 10-F and section 13. section 10-F did not curtail the right to appeal in
any form and permitted appeals from any decision or order made by the CLB.
Therefore, in so far as the CLB acted as a ‘judicial authority’ under section 45
of the 1996 Act, the High Court was authorised by law to hear appeals from
such an order. On the contrary, section 13 restricts the right to appeal to certain orders, i.e., those specified in Order XLIII and section 37. To this extent,
the Commercial Appellate Division is not authorised by law to hear any other
appeals and cannot fit the definition of ‘court authorised by law’ under section
50.
Moreover, with the overhaul of the Companies Act, and creation of the
National Company Law Tribunal (‘NCLT’), as well as the National Company
Law Appellate Tribunal (‘NCLAT’), the landscape has changed significantly.
Earlier, appeals from the CLB, which was a quasi-judicial body,79 lay before
the High Court.80 This has now been replaced with a hierarchy where appeals
from the quasi-judicial NCLT,81 lie before the NCLAT, which is also quasi-judicial.82 Strictly going by the interpretation of section 50 in Sumitomo and
Kandla, an appeal from a NCLT order under section 45 should be decided by
the NCLAT. But this militates against the essence of the 1996 Act, by relegating arbitration matters to adjudication before a non-specialised, quasi-judicial forum.83 Perhaps it is in recognition of this anomaly that the NCLAT has
observed that appeals from orders refusing arbitration under section 45 of the
1996 Act will not be maintainable before it, but before the appropriate forum
as per the 1996 Act itself.84 Either way, the bottom line is that the Sumitomo
logic requires revalidation in light of fundamental legislative changes in the
last decade, and its blanket affirmation in Kandla cannot hold good in this
situation.

IV. THE CASE FOR A NARROW
INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 13
Prior to, and even after Kandla, several decisions have reiterated that the
proviso to section 13(1A) means that only appeals under Order XLIII and
section 37 are maintainable under section 13.85 For instance, in Brahmos, the
79
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bench was called upon to consider the maintainability of an appeal under section 13, against an order passed under section 124 of the Trademarks Act,
1999.86 After noticing the previous decisions in HPL and Eros, the court reiterated that after the CCA came into force, only orders under Order XLIII
and section 37 would be appealable, and section 124, Trademarks Act, orders
were not included therein.87 However, on facts it was held that the appeal
was maintainable as section 13 was not attracted. The appeal was filed prior
to re-designation of the underlying suit as a commercial suit, thereby vesting
the pre-CCA right to appeal on the date of its filing.88 Even though most other
cases under section 1389 have followed a similar path of reasoning, there are
two notable departures.
In Arun Dev, it was held that the bar under section 13(2) was inapplicable
to section 50 appeals under the Letters Patent, on the basis that section 13 bars
an appeal under Letters Patent only if no appeal is provided under the 1996
Act.90 More recently, in Superon, the Delhi High Court held that section 13(1A)
is an enabling provision, allowing appeals against all orders and judgments
of the Commercial Division, and the proviso thereto is merely clarificatory.91
Therefore, orders passed by a Single Judge exercising commercial jurisdiction,
which are not passed under the CPC (and by necessary corollary, the 1996
Act) do not attract the limitation of the proviso and will be covered by section 13(1A).92 It also distinguished HPL and Samsung93 on this ground as the
impugned orders therein emanated from the provisions of the CPC.
In my opinion, neither of these conclusions are sustainable in law. A plain
reading of section 13(2) shows that the reasoning in Arun Dev is devoid of
any textual basis. The wording of section 13(2) unambiguously states that “no
appeal shall lie … otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this
Act”. In this context, the phrase ‘this Act’ can only mean the CCA itself, and
not any other enactment, including the 1996 Act.94 Therefore, in the face of a
blanket bar on Letters Patent appeals, a section 50 appeal cannot be maintainable as such, irrespective of whether the 1996 Act provides for an appeal. It is
worth noting here that in referring to Arun Dev, the decision in HPL suggests
that the basis of its reasoning is that the phrase “said Act” relates to the 1996
86
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Act therein, and to the CPC on HPL’s own facts.95 However, section 13(2) uses
the phrase “this Act” rather than “said Act”. Therefore, to this extent, even
HPL proceeds erroneously. However, its main reasoning continues to be sound
law, as noted in Part I above.96
Similarly, in Superon, notwithstanding its conclusion that the impugned
order was passed under Rule 5, Chapter II of the Delhi High Court (Original
Side) Rules, 2018, the reasoning is assailable on three grounds. First, its failure to consider Kandla renders it per incuriam; second, it ignores well-settled
law regarding the presumptive interpretation of a proviso as explained above;97
and third, it militates against clear legislative intent to remove a multi-tiered
appeal process and expedite commercial dispute resolution.98 Even otherwise,
its analysis is wholly unattractive. While it could perhaps answer the section
50 conundrum, it would then open up the Pandora’s box for a host of other
appeals under section 13, which has been eschewed by courts time and again.99
It is notable that Superon has not only been distinguished by a coordinate
bench of the Delhi High Court,100 but in fact, another recent coordinate bench
judgment of the same court has noticed some of the criticisms outlined above
and has declined to follow Superon on this basis, holding itself to be bound by
Kandla instead.101
In my view, the most reasonable course would be to read section 13 narrowly102 by holding that only appeals under section 37 and Order XLIII are
permitted, and appeals under section 50 are no longer maintainable, except if
preferred directly to the Supreme Court. This interpretation would not only
give full effect to the legislative intent of reducing the number of appeals for
commercial disputes, but would also promise greater enforceability for foreign
awards.
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V. CONCLUSION
In 2015, when the 253rd Report of the Law Commission of India re-examined the issue of fast-track commercial courts, many of the recommendations it
made were intended as improvements over previous efforts.103 The underlying
aim, as before, was to ensure speedy disposal of high value disputes, thereby,
providing assurance to foreign investors in India. One of the salient features
of the report, concerned the appellate procedure for commercial disputes.
While noting that previous versions of a proposed legislation had envisaged
a single appeal to the Supreme Court, the report observed that this was not
feasible, and would make the process lengthier, costlier and less effective.104
Consequently, it was suggested that appeals should be permissible from final
judgments of the Commercial Division/Court and commercial tribunals like
the CLB/NCLT in addition to orders under Order XLIII of the CPC or under
section 37 of the 1996 Act and “against no other orders”.105 This was reflected
in three separate provisions in the draft bill annexed to the 253rd Report, i.e.
Sections 14, 15 and 16, which dealt with appeals from orders, decrees and
judgments of tribunals, respectively.106 Unfortunately, this clarity of thought
was lost in subsequent iterations, and the final legislation, while arguably possessing the same intent, was unable to express it unambiguously.
In the five years since then, this uncertainty has only become more pronounced. As is evident from the judicial decisions analysed in this essay,
the interpretation of section 13 remains unclear at best and much of this is
a result of its rather unhappy wording. If the intent was to disallow endless
appeals from interlocutory orders, the application of Khimji could have been
clearly excluded by using ‘decree’ instead of ‘judgment’, as was done in the
Law Commission of India’s proposed bill.107 Similarly, if section 50 appeals
were meant to be excluded, the proviso to section 13(1A) ought to have been
couched in clear negative terms. Conversely, if section 50 appeals were not to
be excluded, its express inclusion in the proviso would have easily achieved
that. But by following through on neither of these lines of thought, the legislature has not only created a conundrum regarding section 50, but has given
courts the leeway to expand section 13 even beyond its application to section
50. At present, appeals from HPL,108 Samsung,109 Eros110 and other similar mat103
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ters are pending adjudication before the Supreme Court,111 which has noted the
divergence between the Bombay and Delhi views and may partially resolve this
confusion.112 But as Kandla has reaffirmed, judicial interpretation cannot entirely
resolve textual flaws in legislations. Therefore, the best way forward would be
for a legislative amendment to decisively settle the matter, by giving full effect
to the intent behind the CCA.
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